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In this article I propose a way of thinking about aesthetic and artistic 
verdicts that would keep them distinct from one another. The former are 
refl ections of the kinds of things we prefer and take pleasure in; the latter 
are refl ections of other judgments we make about the kinds of achieve-
ments that are made in works of art. In part to support this view of 
verdicts, I also propose a way of keeping distinct the description, the 
interpretation, and the evaluation of works of art. (And along the way, 
I worry about whether we offer the same kinds of interpretations of the 
objects of our aesthetic pleasures, properly considered, that we clearly do 
offer with respect to works of art.) The thesis I propose—the achievement 
model—is not original with me. What is original, perhaps, is that it is 
posed as an alternative to two other views of artistic evaluation, namely 
the appeal to “ideal critics” and the appeal to one way of understanding 
our preferences with regard to works of art. I do not attempt to show 
that each of these alternatives meets with insuperable problems; but I do 
indicate what I take to be the substantive content of those problems. In 
the end, in order to fl esh out the thesis I propose, I borrow some material 
from the literature on human well-being concerning how we determine 
what an achievement is.
Keywords: Description, interpretation, evaluation, art, aesthetic 
pleasure, achievement.
“Appreciation” and “criticism” are terms in philosophical aesthetics and 
philosophy of art whose meanings have proved elusive. These terms are 
often used to mean description, and sometimes to mean interpretation. 
But they may be used to refer to evaluation. Indeed, one prominent 
fi gure in analytic aesthetics has argued not only that criticism needs to 
be revived but also that it is inescapably evaluative (Carroll 2008). For 
sake of precision, when it comes to evaluative judgments, we should 
follow Sibley in this: we should recognize they are “verdicts” as to the 
quality of the object or activity, whether that which is evaluated is a 
work of art or not (Sibley 1965: 136).
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It is on the last of these, verdictive judgments, that I wish to focus in 
this article. I will, however, begin with some remarks about description 
and will also say a few things about interpretations. Both of the latter 
sets of comments will be made in regard to their uses in stating and 
defending verdictive judgments.
1. A crudely sketched distinction
Aesthetic experiences, including aesthetic experiences that are specifi -
cally of works of art, form one kind of pleasurable experience of objects 
or activities. The differences among them, as experiences, has primar-
ily to do with differences among the kinds of thing one experiences.
Clear and obvious instances of things we might experience aestheti-
cally include such things as sunsets, moonrises, cats, lizards, oak trees, 
grass, wind, silence, and so on. Equally clear and equally obvious in-
stances of works of art that we might also experience (whether aesthet-
ically or not) will include a Bach concerto, a performance of the play A 
Streetcar Named Desire, the novel don Quixote, the Vimeo of Uterus 
Man, the video game Rocket League, and so on.
If we had to say or write down what we experienced—especially if 
we had to say what made our experience of it an aesthetic experience of 
a work of art—we would have to describe it; we might have to interpret 
it; and perhaps we would be inclined to evaluate it as well. A quick and 
crude sketch of the distinctions on which I am relying could go like this.
A person describes objects or activities (including of course, works of art) if 
she presents a statement of the evidence given to her senses, which state-
ment is as free as she can muster from either interpretation or evaluation.1 
A person interprets objects or activities if she (a) gives a description of that 
work, (b) states, without evaluation, what she thinks the work is, is for, is 
about (possibly in some large sense), or means and c) ties that signifi cance 
to details in the work’s description. 
A person evaluates objects or activities (renders a verdict regarding them) if 
she (a) presents a statement either about how well what she has described 
achieves what she thinks it is, is for, is about, or means or about whether 
what she believes it is, is for, is about, or means is worth doing or is true; 
and (b) states either what descriptive facts about the work supports the 
contention it does or does not achieve its aims (under some kind-determi-
nation) or why the work’s aims are in some way defective (under any kind-
determination).
This distinction admits of intermediate states. However, I do not think 
it is “scalar” and not a genuine distinction after all. That is, despite the 
possibility of intermediate cases, this does not seem to admit “degrees” 
along a “spectrum” in the standard senses of those words.
1 I set on one side the question whether aesthetic and artistic descriptions are 
the result of inferences (Dorsch 2013).
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2. Aesthetic verdicts of works of art and other things
At the level of description, it is important that we observe a distinction 
between aesthetic and non-aesthetic properties of objects and activi-
ties, and that we determine which aesthetic features are in play in a 
given object or activity at least partly by determining what category 
the object or activity is likely to belong to based on its non-aesthetic 
features (Sibley 1965; Walton 1970). Many works of art, in particular, 
demand evaluations that are more or less plausible depending, in part, 
on what the descriptive facts actually are. And, actually, this seems 
right whether the object or activity in question is a work of art or not.
Consider how you might support the claim 
(1) “That’s a gorgeous sunrise.”
Since this is in the present tense, I suppose you would frequently just 
point to it and say, “Look!” But if your interlocutor looked and did not 
respond in the same way, how would you go on? Here (and I am just 
guessing) you might point out that it is particularly golden, that it re-
fl ects golden sunlight off of low lying and level clouds (stratus or alto-
stratus clouds), and so on. 
Yet there is a puzzle here. If our focus is only on our aesthetic ver-
dicts regarding works of art, then surely Paul Ziff has this much right: 
anything that can be viewed at all (including works of art) can be viewed 
aesthetically (Ziff 1984). And here is a particularly troubling example:
(2) “The Morris Louis painting in the Nelson-Atkins really makes 
me weak in the knees.”
This example, which is not uncommon, suggests that our aesthetic ver-
dicts about works of art are not only made on the basis of our subjective 
preferences, it also suggests that, in some way, they are also about 
those same subjective preferences.2
And that, in turns, raises an important question for those interested 
in our aesthetic reactions to the world including the artworld, namely, 
whether our aesthetic judgments are merely indexed to us according 
to preferences or are our expressions of those preferences. These, as 
Barry Smith has argued, are each fl awed attempts to respond to the 
fact of aesthetic disagreement. In fact, if either of them is right, we lose 
the idea that people offering alternative aesthetic evaluations have ac-
tually disagreed (Smith 2012).
3. Interpretation
Of judgments about what an object or activity is, is for, is about, or 
means, I shall have only a little to say. First I should observe that 
the closer one is to the fi rst item on this list—saying what something 
2 Part of the reason this is puzzling is that most of our sensory experience is 
subjective, and yet most of our judgments based on that experience are matters of 
objective fact about the world.
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is—the more nearly descriptive one’s judgments will be. Sometimes 
category-placement just is an interpretation. Alternatively, sometimes 
an interpretation, when it settles what something is, turns out to look 
a great deal like, and may even function in our reasoning as a descrip-
tion, because it works to settle the “what is it?” question by means of 
category-placement (Walton 1970). Furthermore, this observation goes 
a long way toward explaining what I meant when I remarked earlier 
that the distinction I am employing is “crude.”
Conversely, the further along toward the last on the list—saying 
what an object or activity means—the more likely it is that our judg-
ments are evaluative in nature. There is a reason for this, namely that 
it is more likely in such cases that one will be tempted to infl ect the 
interpretation with one’s own or one’s group’s preferences. For if one 
asserts that a work has a certain meaning, it is fairly natural to ask 
“meaning what, and to whom?” Many ways of answering that question 
make appeal to what an individual or group fi nds signifi cant. And, I 
confess, I know of no way to explicate the idea of the signifi cance of 
something to someone without reference to her, or their, preferences.
There is a second point: when one engages in interpretations of ei-
ther of the latter three kinds—saying what an object or activity is for, 
what it is about, or what it means—the more likely it is that the inter-
pretation will have been offered of a work of art, broadly construed. 
This may be indicated by noticing that we typically do not render these 
kinds of interpretations of sunsets, moonrises, cats, lizards, oak trees, 
grass, wind, silences, and so on. People do not often remark about what 
a sunset, for example, is for, what it is about, or what it means. Yet 
of course people often offer precisely these kinds of interpretations of 
Bach concertos, performances of Streetcar, of don Quixote, of Uterus 
Man, of presentations or playings of Rocket League or Until Dawn, and 
so on.
A third point, specifi cally about interpretations of works of art, is in 
order. In some recent work, Robert Stecker has pulled back on his early 
enthusiasm for holding that art-relevant interpretations are about the 
“work meaning” of the work (Stecker 2015). Stecker writes this:
For me this is interpreting a piece for its work meaning as I defi ne that 
notion in Interpretation and Construction: Art, Speech, and the Law (Black-
well, 2003). However, in setting out this test, I try to leave it more open just 
which types of interpretation provide the necessary understanding because 
I want to allow someone to accept the test without buying into my views 
about interpretation. (Stecker 2015: 395, n7)
Jane Forsey had taken Stecker to task about the earlier claim that 
interpretations are only about the “work meaning” of a work and sug-
gested that, instead, we should think less about the meanings of works 
of art and more about their functions.
To be sure, her point is that we are not likely to get an adequate ac-
count of so-called “everyday aesthetics” without doing so (Forsey 2014). 
But I do not take her opposition to viewing the aesthetics of the every-
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day through the lens of philosophy of art quite as seriously as she seems 
to. Nor for that matter do I take Stecker’s oft expressed insistence of in-
terpretation as the determination of “work meaning” all that seriously. 
One reason for both of these views is that interpretive judgments about 
works of art come in all of the kinds I mentioned above. That is, they 
are as likely to be concerned with what a work of art is for as they are to 
be concerned about what a work of art is about or what it means. This 
is especially true when the interpretations concern certain kinds of ce-
ramics, many works of architecture, many documentary movies, and 
so on. In contrast, claims about what a work is about or what it means 
are more nearly about what has been at the center of discussions of the 
interpretation of painting since the 1950s or so. And claims about what 
a work is for are clearly about the function of the work.
4. Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art
Brock Rough claims there is a clear distinction, at least on the behav-
ioral level, between philosophical aesthetics and philosophy of art, for 
“the study of aesthetics is the study of the felt quality of perceptions of 
the senses, while the study of art is the study of the historical practice 
of making art objects” (Rough 2014). Rough also offers a second way 
of drawing the distinction, this time couched in terms of a distinction 
between aesthetic and artistic properties. The idea is that
Aesthetic properties are those that are the properties of sensory taste that 
we perceive in the things we experience: properties like ‘beautiful,’ ‘dynam-
ic,’ ‘graceful’… Artistic properties are those that are relevant to artworks: 
facts about the context of creation, who the artist was, when they made the 
work, what their intentions for the work were, etc. 
He does this, as the rest of his blog essay reveals, in order to note how 
diffi cult it actually is to make out the distinction in a principled way. 
For there may be no principle that successfully distinguishes between 
them at the level of description. Moreover, he claims, 
there is no obviously principled way of distinguishing between, say, the 
pleasure felt by slipping into a hot bath, the awe one feels before a brilliant 
sunset, and whatever aesthetic response is felt when one contemplates a 
Caravaggio.
Notice that the claim he makes is that there is no principled way to dis-
tinguish among the aesthetic pleasures taken in everyday objects and 
activities and the aesthetic pleasures taken in works of art.
But is there no way to distinguish between verdictive claims that 
are aesthetic and verdictive claims that are artistic? A more successful 
attempt is made at the level of verdicts by Robert Stecker in a series of 
essays beginning at least as far back as 2007. The “test”—as he calls 
it—for whether a verdict is aesthetic or artistic is this:
artistic value derives from what artists successfully intend to do in their 
works as mediated by functions of the art forms and genres to which the 
works belong. [So] does one need to understand the work to appreciate its 
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being valuable in that way? If so, it is an artistic value. If not, it is not. 
(Stecker 2012: 357)
And, in a later essay still, he has “proposed fl eshing out ‘understand-
ing’ in terms of the kind of insight we gain through interpretation or a 
certain kind of interpretation” (Stecker 2015: 395).3
In this context, consider this evaluative statement:
(3) “Star Wars Episode VII: The Force Awakens, is a better movie 
than Star Wars Episode 1: The Phantom Menace.”
It is certainly possible to express this judgment and, when asked to sup-
port or defend it—by, say, someone who actually liked Jar Jar Binks—to 
simply stare as if to say, “how can you possibly ask me to defend a pref-
erence?!” This would be to take the expression “is a better movie than” 
as merely indicated a comparative preference, much like your prefer-
ence for spinach over broccoli; or even simply for okra. In that case, 
given Stecker’s test, you would be uttering an aesthetic evaluation.
But of course, you are likely instead to be tempted to say things 
about the plot structures of the two movies, the characters and the 
roles they play, even the acting.4 But notice that now you are discuss-
ing the descriptive features of the movies and of movies, as works of 
art. That is, you are calling attention to features of the movies qua 
made-objects, perhaps even giving an interpretation of the movies, so 
as to justify the comparative judgment you have made. Your verdict 
will be, as Stecker’s test proposes, an artistic verdictive judgment.
What this suggests is that, in certain cases, both aesthetic and ar-
tistic verdictive judgments can be professed about the same things. 
But a further point is that usually artistic verdicts concern man-made, 
craft-based works of art.
Finally, consider these claims.
(4) “That was a gorgeous sunrise.” 
(5) “That sunrise was quite good.”
(6) “That was a better sunrise than the one yesterday.”
(7) “Sunrises in this part of the country are more rewarding than 
those at home.”
I would not dispute that you could make comparative judgments of 
these latter two sorts. But what is crucial is that you need not under-
stand how sunrises occur—including how clouds of dust, for example, 
affect their vibrancy—in order to make such judgments. And I conclude 
that, at the verdictive level, we do have a distinction—between aes-
thetic and artistic verdicts—that is worth drawing and worth paying 
attention to.
A good deal of confusion is caused by not keeping these straight. For 
example, Jerrold Levinson writes this:
3 The “certain way of interpreting” he refers to here relects his commitment to 
“work meaning,” discussed above, at the end of the previous section.
4 Of course, should you make disparaging remarks about Liam Neeson’s acting 
in The Phantom Menace, I confess I would have to agree. 
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In this short article I explore two related themes, between which there is, I 
hope to show, a curious tension. The fi rst is the fact of there being demon-
strably better and worse artworks. The second is the undeniable importance 
of personal taste as regards preferences among works of art.
What should be the relationship between what one as an individual prefers 
in the realm of art and what is objectively artistically superior? To what de-
gree should the former be aligned with the latter? Might there be a confl ict 
between these two apparent values, that is, on the one hand, one’s own taste 
in art and, on the other, what is truly better art? If there is such a confl ict, in 
what way might it be resolved or reduced? (Levinson 2010: 225)
This question posed by Levinson depends on the acceptance to two 
facts: a) that there are demonstrably better and worse artworks with 
b) that our tastes—what we prefer—differ with respect to works of art. 
One thing this points to is that there is a bifurcation in our understand-
ing of “verdicts,” between the verdict we would make on behalf of every-
one and the verdict we would make on our own behalf.
5. Three theories of criticism
Many people believe that, because the verdict we make on our own behalf 
is ineluctably infl ected by our personal preferences, there really is no pos-
sibility of rendering verdicts on everyone else’s behalf. For that seems to 
require a level of objectivity (or at least intersubjectivity) that the sec-
ond fact shows, it is sometimes said, we cannot aspire to. On the basis 
of accepting the second of the facts that Levinson refers to, many people 
deny that the fi rst fact claim is actually true. This observation about what 
many people have had to say has given rise to at least three different 
theories of criticism, or of evaluation, i.e., of verdictive judgments.
The fi rst “solution”
In Hume’s famous essay “Of the Standard of Taste” we have the fi rst 
possible solution (Hume 1757). This solution allows for the two fact-
claims to be true and resolves them by holding that we have good rea-
son to appeal to “ideal critics” who possess good taste and who can 
discern which objects are worthy of aesthetic attention. There are a 
number of problems with “the ideal critics solution,” as it has been 
called. But one advantage it has is that it seems to square with the fact 
we are able to learn from others, others whose judgment we trust, and 
so whose good taste should lead us to choose the right things. It also 
squares with the fact we do seem to acquire “taste” from following the 
judgments of others whom we trust.
But these advantages form a two-edged sword: for at least some of 
those others whom we trust may just be snobs. That, at any rate, seems 
to be the current view of most undergraduates—and their teachers—in 
university level institutions in the USA. And they are not alone, of 
course (Kieran 2010). Of course, this attitude on the part of many may 
be nothing more than prejudice; and there is no reason to think that 
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we should follow the advice of the ignorant over that offered by the 
educated. However, we will make no progress by tossing about insults.
There are, as already indicated, some other, and more severe, prob-
lems with “the ideal critics solution.” Briefl y they concern two things: 
Does the artistic appreciation of a work of art depend on fi rst-hand 
acquaintance with that work of art? There is independent, empirical, 
evidence that this appeal, to the need for fi rst person experience in 
order to support any verdictive judgment, is false (Robson 2013). How-
ever, if there were such a need, then there is considerably less pressure 
to accept the ideal critics solution. For no one, we might think, not even 
a truly ideal and reliable critic, could tell me what kind of experience I 
will or should have with any given work of art. And, secondly, how does 
the ideal critic come to her/his views in the fi rst place? It is either by a 
process of learning from others whom they regard as ideal critics or it is 
by a process independent of the existence of ideal critics. If the latter, 
then we don’t need them; all we have to do is undergo that independent 
process. If the former, then we have a “vicious infi nite regress”—that 
is, there is no rational starting place in this chain.
The second “solution”
The second solution is concerned with analyzing more closely what is 
involved in the second of the two facts Levinson cites. This fact, re-
member, is that our individual preferences are considerably diverse 
when it comes to works of art. The question then becomes, absent an 
ideal-critic solution, can an individual come to change her preferences 
rationally so as to make them line up with the judgments made on be-
half of everyone (that even she is inclined to make) that some works of 
art are simply better than others?
This should be seen as engaging with some features of the by-now 
standard analyses of preferences. Among those features will be that 
any two alternative preferences are called “incomparable” whenever 
the preference relation is incomplete with respect to them and they 
will be called “incommensurable” whenever it is impossible to measure 
them with the same unit of measurement. To be sure, cases of irresolv-
able incompleteness are often also regarded as cases of incommensura-
bility. In moral philosophy, irresolvable incompleteness is usually dis-
cussed in terms of the related notion of a moral dilemma. In aesthetics 
and philosophy of art, irresolvable incompleteness is often discussed in 
terms of the related notion of no-fault differences in preferences. But 
the feature of these analyses that is likely to draw most attention is 
the feature of transitivity of both strong preferences, indifference, and 
weak preferences.5 Transitivity is a controversial property, and many 
5 A ≽ B ∧ B ≽ C → A ≽ C (transitivity of weak preference)
The corresponding properties of the other two relations are defi ned analogously:
 A ∼ B ∧ B ∼ C → A ∼ C (transitivity of indifference)
 A ≻ B ∧ B ≻ C → A ≻ C (transitivity of strict preference)
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examples have been offered to show that it does not hold in general. 
These examples can be used to show that actual human beings may 
have cyclic preferences. It does not necessarily follow, however, that 
the same applies to the idealized rational agents of preference logic. 
Perhaps such patterns are due to irrationality or to other factors, such 
as lack of knowledge or discrimination, that prevent actual humans 
from being rational in this sense. There is a strong tradition, not least 
in economic applications, to regard transitivity as a necessary prereq-
uisite of rationality. One crucial argument for this rests on the impor-
tance of preferences for choosing. Preferences should be choice guiding. 
They should be used to guide our choices among the elements of a given 
set of preferred objects or activities. But when choosing, for example, 
from the set, {A, B, C}, a preference relation that is not transitive does 
not guide choice at all: any or none of the alternatives should be chosen 
according to that relation. This is also why a good case can be made 
for running a so-called “dutchbook” argument against someone whose 
preferences are not transitive. The transitivity of preference, it seems, 
is a necessary condition for a meaningful connection between prefer-
ences and choice.
Crucially, for the second solution, preferences have been interpret-
ed as expressions of value. “A ≻ B” then means that more value is as-
signed to A than to B, and “A ∼ B” that the same value is assigned to 
the two. As noted above, there is a strong tradition, particularly in 
economics, to equate preference with choice. Preference is considered 
to be hypothetical choice, and choice to be revealed preference. And, in 
the aesthetic conception of verdicts, we should think of preferences as 
strongly connected to our choices. After all, in daily life we ask each 
other things like this: “Which painting do you like?” or “Do you like 
Jay-Z’s music video of ‘Empire State of Mind’?” We think of these as 
connected to choices about what to buy, look at, and listen to. Even 
when we ask a further question that pushes us to use descriptions to 
support our verdicts, the question is “What was it about X that you 
liked?” And that question too is about what kinds of things we would 
choose to purchase, to look at, and to listen to.
For us to be fully responsible for our choices—especially if we are go-
ing to offer verdicts on everyone’s behalf—we must answer the following 
three questions affi rmatively: (A) Can we have reasons for our prefer-
ences? (B) Can preferences be rationally criticized? And (C) can we re-
ally change our preferences? Whether we can do all three of these things 
is a diffi cult and highly technical issue. But here are some observations.
We rarely consider those who justify their choice only by saying “Be-
cause I preferred to do this” as giving reasons. So, if choices (and hence 
preferences) are justifi able, we have to be able to give reasons for them. 
And one promising way to think of this is in terms of so-called “second 
order” preferences, the preference to be the kind of person who would 
prefer a particular kind of thing or to engage in or disengage from some 
particular kind of activity.
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In practical reasoning, it is an important issue whether preferences 
can be criticized rationally. Preference sets as discussed so far are open 
to rational criticism only insofar as (i) they are inconsistent or (ii) they, 
in combination with beliefs, commit the agent to inferences that make 
the resulting preference sets inconsistent. But we should not be con-
tent with this if we really want to see why an individual might ratio-
nally seek to change her intrinsic preferences.6
There are several, largely empirical reasons, for thinking that peo-
ple’s preferences really do change over time. So, the second solution to 
the problem Levinson points out takes its cue from this discussion and 
concludes a) that we do change our intrinsic preferences, b) that they 
can be criticized from the point of view of taking on board a second-
order preference for higher aesthetic experiences, and c) that there-
fore we can offer reasons, from an aesthetic point of view, about the 
aesthetic aspects of our fi rst-order preferences. Whether we do so, of 
course, depends on how much we are ready to adopt the second order 
preference for “appreciative experiences worth having.” But the point 
is, according to the proponents of this solution, we can.
The third “solution”
The third solution—which I favor—also agrees to the two facts, but 
thinks there is no real tension between them. For it assumes that phil-
osophical aesthetics can account for the second of the facts and philoso-
phy of art can account for the fi rst one. Most of its focus is on the fi rst 
fact: for it offers an “achievement view” of the nature of artistic merit, 
not an aesthetic view that is grounded in fi rst-person experience, the 
quality of that experience, and preference sets. That is, contrary to the 
assumption shared between the Humean/Levinsonian solution and the 
second solution as well, it does not assume that the artistic merit of a 
work of art is to be explained by its “capacity..., in virtue of its form 
and content, to afford appreciative experiences worth having” (Levin-
son 2015: 226).
The third solution assumes there really are differences between 
philosophy of art and aesthetics. But it does not agree with the assump-
tion that artistic merit depends on the capacity to provide aesthetic 
experiences of some kind.
Crucially, it holds that the fi rst and second facts that Levinson de-
scribes have two very different kinds of explanations. The fi rst kind of 
claim—that there are demonstrably better and worse artworks—as-
serts the artistic merits of a work of art on behalf of everyone by refer-
ence to the achievements made or not made in the particular work of 
art. Whether such achievements are or are not made in the work is an 
objective question of fact. The second kind of claim—that our tastes 
6 A clear and interesting discussion of extrinsic and intrinsic preferences, and 
the reason this demand is placed on intrinsic preferences can be found at (Hansson 
and Grüne-Yanoff 2012).
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differ with respect to works of art—asserts the aesthetic value of a par-
ticular work of art to some individual or group on the basis of the aes-
thetic qualities that that individual or group prefers; and preferences 
are usually subjective or intersubjective.
This third solution squares with our standard ways of dealing with 
the lack of artistic value of forgeries. For, despite the fact they may 
provide more “appreciative experiences worth having” than even the 
originals may, they may still be objectively less valuable, in the same 
way that a piece of property may be less valuable, from a realtor’s point 
of view, than some potential homeowners feel it is because of their pref-
erence to own it. It squares also with everyday kinds of remark about 
the aesthetic value of some works of art being merely opinions, because 
those comments are explicitly about what we like, and are not really 
about what is better or worse. Claims that are genuinely about what is 
better or worse in a work of art rest on considerations of the achieve-
ments in them, not on our varying preferences for or against them. 
Moreover, this solution is better positioned to explain why some works 
of art do not aim to provide high-quality aesthetic experiences. And, 
fi nally, it results in no contradiction between either fi nding that a work 
is good but not to one’s liking or fi nding that a work is bad but is some-
thing one really likes (like a so-called “guilty pleasure”).
This solution does not seem to explain why we have and continue 
to have the practices of art making and reception that we do have. One 
standard story, one that initially seems plausible, is that art practices 
arise in any culture because of a human preference for aesthetic ex-
periences deemed worth having. A second part of that standard story 
is that art occurs in every culture because people will develop ways to 
ensure we have access to that kind of experience—and art is the most 
promising way to do that (Matthen 2013, 2015). I should caution that 
we must tread carefully here because there simply is very little actual 
direct evidence that this story, plausible as it is, is true (Nadal et al. 
2018).
One way to address this issue is suggested by Noel Carroll (Carroll 
2016).
As an appreciative heuristic applied to art…the…approach proposes that, 
in order to appreciate a work of art, one must 1) identify its intended pur-
pose or purposes and 2) determine the adequacy or appropriateness of its 
form—its formal choices—to the realization or articulation of its intended 
purpose (or purposes) (Carroll 2016: 4–5).
Moreover, “although, by laying out these elements sequentially, it may 
seem as though I am suggesting that they must be performed sequen-
tially—fi rst fi nd the purpose, then see how it is or is not implemented 
successfully—these operations need not be performed in any specifi c 
order” (Carroll 2016: 5).
 By “identifying its intended purpose” Carroll shows, I believe, how 
we might answer the challenge posed by the standard plausible stories 
about the evolution of art. This is because, according to Carroll and oth-
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ers, the intended “purpose” of a work of art needs to be construed very 
broadly so as to include discovering an intended meaning, or discover-
ing an intended aesthetic effect, discovering the purpose of providing 
cognitive experiences, discovering the purpose of providing certain spe-
cifi c affective experiences for an audience, and so on. And there is noth-
ing incompatible within the idea that art—as a set of human practices 
of making and appreciating (including evaluating)—grew out of an ini-
tial impulse to provide aesthetic experiences worth having and then 
outgrew that, historically, to become a set of practices having purposes 
that are not necessarily aesthetic, or not only aesthetic, in nature.
6. Achievements and artistic verdicts
Aesthetic and artistic values and verdicts are different, not only because 
their targets are different, but also because one involves the values as-
sociated with preferences and the other involves the values of artistic 
achievements. David Davies articulates the commonly accepted alter-
native to this view (which he and others call “aesthetic empiricism” and 
with which he disagrees) as follows: “the basic principle of empiricist 
axiology [is] that the artistic value of a work of art resides in qualities of 
the experience it elicits in an appropriately primed viewer” where “ex-
perience” is understood not only to refer to direct perceptual encounters 
but also imaginative engagement with a work of art (Davies 2003: 255).
In contrast, Davies and Carroll both urge us to think of verdicts—
the evaluations of works of art—on the achievement model. Carroll 
puts the point—which he calls “appreciation-as-sizing-up”—this way:
This sense of “appreciate,” in contrast to the “appreciation-as-liking” sense, 
is impersonal. Clearly, one can assess the value of something without liking 
it. One can assess the value of a piece of property without being attracted to 
it, for example, a decrepit tenement building. Furthermore, if “depreciate” 
is the opposite of “appreciate,” one can surely estimate the diminished or 
diminishing value of something, while still regarding it with affection. I still 
cherish my old cashmere sweater although I realize its diminished value—
not only is it somewhat tattered, but it has no more use-value for me, since 
I (unfortunately) outgrew it long ago. (Carroll 2016: 2)
Still, we can see why we might need more details about artistic achieve-
ments (Dorsch 2014). So, I offer the following considerations.
In a paper she initially delivered at the Central Division Meeting of 
the American Philosophical Association in 2014, Gwen Bradford was 
concerned about the question of whether claims about the meaning of 
life can ever be “objective,” that is, whether a life can have “objective 
worth.” One way to think about this is to suggest a way that “achieve-
ments can have objective worth” (Bradford 2015: 1).
Among the background assumptions in this paper is “that achieve-
ments are valuable in virtue of challenge, inter alia.” (1) Bradford as-
sumes this here, although she has argued for it elsewhere (Bradford 
2016). The structure of achievements is this: “an achievement involves a 
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process that culminates in a product, outcome, or goal” (Bradford 2016: 
796). Her assumption is based on the fact that not every achievement 
is of a worthwhile goal. Some simply are not—for example, climbing a 
mountain or peeling a banana—while others of course are—for example, 
painting the Sistine Chapel ceiling or creating the small pox vaccine. 
So, the intrinsic value of achievements, if they have any, probably lies 
elsewhere than in the fact they culminate in worthwhile goals. And the 
assumption she makes here is that the value has something to do with 
the diffi culty, or challenge, that the adopter of a goal presents to herself.
Using J. S. Mill’s famous “crisis” over imagining that all his life 
projects might be realized, Bradford notes that “Mill subsequently has 
something of a breakdown, overwhelmed by the sense that his aim 
has now “lost its charm” and seems worthless and “tragic” (Mill, 1989 
[1873]. Autobiography: 112)” (Bradford 2015: 2). Bradford uses this 
story, in part, to motivate the claim that “there is something signifi -
cant about the pursuit that is distinctive from the fi nished product” 
(Bradford 2015: 3).
But if there is something signifi cant about pursuit beyond the value 
of the product, what precisely is that source of signifi cance and value? 
It does not consist in the outright impossibility of a goal, such as squar-
ing the circle. That Sisyphean picture of a goal is, perhaps, “the arche-
type of meaninglessness” (Bradford 2015: 4). However, there are other 
reasons a goal might be diffi cult or seem unreachable, and not be a 
paradigm of meaninglessness. Suppose “the goal develops and expands 
as we approach it,” where this means both that “new aspects of the goal 
emerge and so the pursuit expands” and that “our understanding of 
what would amount to completion of the goal changes as we progress” 
(Bradford 2015: 4). Tellingly, the examples Bradford gives to illustrate 
this conception of what she calls “self-propagating goals” are the goals 
of a scientifi c understanding of some phenomena and the goals of art-
ists. These seem both to have value that is independent of whether the 
goal is arrived at and to lend value to activities in pursuit of such goals. 
For, as Bradford comments, in such cases “the more you accomplish, 
the more is possible for you to accomplish” (Bradford 2015: 6).
So it is, one might well think, with works of art. Consider now two 
aesthetic evaluations and two artistic evaluations of the same object.
(8) “The Ennead Architect’s design for the Natural History Museum 
of Utah, which once I loved, no longer appeals to me; and I do not 
enjoy looking at it.”
(8*) “The Ennead Architect’s design for the Natural History Museum 
of Utah fails because it is a hodge-podge of architectural styles 
and no effort is or has been made to integrate those varying 
styles either into a whole in which the styles seem to refl ect on 
each other or into a whole in which the styles can be seen to 
complement each other.”7
7 Neither of these is true, by the way. I offer them only as examples.
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(2) “The Morris Louis painting in the Nelson-Atkins really makes 
me weak in the knees.”
(2*) “The Morris Louis painting owned and displayed by the Nelson-
Atkins Gallery is one of his Veil Paintings, a “stain painting” 
consisting of waves of brilliant, curving color-shapes submerged 
in translucent washes through which separate colors emerge 
principally at the edges; and in the stain paintings Louis was 
concerned with the classic problems of pictorial space and the 
fl atness of the picture plane.”
One thing that is immediately evident in the two verdicts is that one 
does not need to understand anything about the museum or the paint-
ing to have aesthetic reactions like (8) and (2). In contrast, it is diffi cult 
to see how one could have reactions like (8*) or (2*) without such un-
derstanding or mis-understanding. 
So, what is to be understood/misunderstood in these latter two 
cases? It’s fairly natural to say that (8*) holds there was a manifestly 
possible goal that was not even aimed at and (2*) holds there was a pos-
sible goal that was aimed at and achieved. And what was understood 
or misunderstood on the part of she who asserted (8*) and (2*) was the 
nature of the achievement, what was there to be aimed at, so to speak, 
and the effort it would have taken or did take to achieve it.
This, however, is not the fi nal word. For consider the achievements 
imagined in the following two cases:
(8*) “The Ennead Architect’s design for the Natural History Museum 
of Utah fails because it is a hodge-podge of architectural styles 
and no effort is or has been made to integrate those varying 
styles either into a whole in which the styles seem to refl ect on 
each other or into a whole in which the styles can be seen to 
complement each other.”
(9*) “The Ennead Architect’s design for the Natural History Museum 
of Utah fails because the function of a natural history museum 
is to be programmable in such a way that its patrons can get the 
information they seek; and this building is not programmable in 
that way.”8
(8*) is clearly about styles and combinations of styles in architectural 
design; and (9*) is about the functions that architects must think about 
in developing and executing their designs. If, following Stecker, we 
hold that what has to be understood in works of art is expressed in the 
interpretations we give of works, and if we hold—as I do—that inter-
pretations are either about what a work of art is for, what it is about, or 
what it means, then we should say that (8*) is more about work mean-
ing and (9*) is more about function, i.e., what the object is for.
Are these in the kind of tension that Forsey seems to think? I think, 
rather, that we should be pluralists about what it takes to evaluate a 
8 Neither of these is true either.
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work of art and that to render an artistic verdict, as opposed to render-
ing an aesthetic verdict, one must show how one understands the object 
or activity being evaluated. But that requirement can be met in a vari-
ety of ways, by any kind of interpretation of the art object or art activity 
or even by a placing an art object in a category for descriptive purposes 
(so long as the category itself is suffi ciently action- or belief-guiding).
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